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 Disaster Risk Reduction through Risk Pooling: The Case 
of Hazard Risk Pooling Schemes 
 Morten  Broberg and  Erica  Hovani * 
 1.  Disaster Risk Reduction and Risk Pooling 
 In March 2015, 187 United Nations (UN) member states adopted the Sendai Framework for 
Disaster Risk Reduction 2015– 2030 (Sendai Framework). 1 The Sendai Framework lays down 
four specii c priorities for action. The third of these four priorities is entitled ‘Investing in disaster 
risk reduction for resilience’. At ‘national and local levels’ this priority entails, amongst others, 
‘[t] o promote mechanisms for disaster risk transfer and insurance, risk- sharing and retention and 
i nancial protection, as appropriate, for both public and private investment in order to reduce 
the i nancial impact of disasters on Governments and societies, in urban and rural areas’. 2 At 
the ‘global and regional levels’ this priority entails, amongst others, ‘[t]o promote the develop-
ment and strengthening of disaster risk transfer and sharing mechanisms and instruments in 
close cooperation with partners in the international community, business, international i nan-
cial institutions and other relevant stakeholders’. 3 
 It is thus clear that under the Sendai Framework risk transfer, risk sharing, and insurance 
should be promoted and strengthened at national levels with the support of the international 
community and other stakeholders. However, the Framework does not say much more than this. 
 In this chapter we will examine a group of regional multi- country insurance risk pools that 
have been established in the Global South to address the risks caused by certain hazards such 
as droughts, hurricanes, tsunamis, and excess rainfall. The rationale underlying an insurance 
risk pool is that it capitalises on the natural diversii cation of these hazard risks across a large 
geographic area, thereby allowing the risk pool member countries to respond to certain but 
 *  The authors gratefully acknowledge the critical comments provided by Niels B. Holm- Nielsen, the World Bank 
Group’s Global Technical Lead for Resilience and Disaster Risk Management (DRM) regarding a draft of the pre-
sent chapter as well as the excellent assistance provided by research assistant Jonathan Caspar Meinolf Ulrich during 
the work on the chapter. Obviously, the authors alone shall be held responsible for the views and fallacies which 
appear in the i nal chapter. 
 1  United Nations Ofi ce for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR), Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015– 
2030 (18 March 2015) A/ CONF.224/ CRP.1. The Sendai Framework replaced UN, Report of the World Conference 
on Disaster Reduction (Kobe, Hyogo, Japan, 25 18– 22 January 2005) A/ CONF.206/ 6, ch. 1, Resolution 2:  ‘Hyogo 
Framework for Action 2005– 2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters’. The Sendai 
Framework was endorsed by the UN General Assembly in June 2015. See UNGA, Resolution 69/ 283 (23 June 
2015)  A/ RES/ 69/ 283. Available at  www.un.org/ en/ development/ desa/ population/ migration/ generalassembly/ docs/ 
globalcompact/ A_ RES_ 69_ 283.pdf (accessed 23 May 2018). 
 2  Sendai Framework, para. 30(b). 
 3  Ibid ., para. 31(b). 
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unpredictable risks whilst managing their risk as a group in a i nancially efi cient manner. 4 In 
this way the member countries can lower the cost of responses to these hazards, 5 they will be 
better positioned to prevent the disasters from becoming humanitarian crises, and they will be 
better equipped to service those citizens affected by the disaster. 6 
 In what follows, we examine the regulatory framework relating to the existing transnational 
Global South risk pooling schemes and consider the value of these schemes within the context 
of disaster risk reduction (DRR). Our examination builds on empirical evidence of existing 
transnational risk pools such as the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF) 
and the African Risk Capacity (ARC), and we will present and analyse the current uses of risk 
pooling within the context of specii c hazards. These risk pools are i rst of all aimed at weather- 
related hazards where the on- going climate change presents a particular challenge. For this 
reason we will use our analysis to identify strengths and weaknesses of using risk pooling in a 
climate change context. 7 
 In terms of our approach, we i rst provide a brief overview of how climate change impacts 
may produce hazards and how societies may have to build resilience in order to cope with 
these hazards ( section 2 ). Thereupon we turn to examine the existing transnational risk pooling 
schemes aimed at addressing certain hazards in the Global South ( section 3 ). Next, we identify 
and assess the pros and cons of these risk pooling schemes ( section 4 ). Finally, we sum up our 
main i ndings ( section 5 ). 
 2.  Climate Change as a Hazard 
 All reliable data show that the world is presently experiencing climate change – also known as 
global warming – causing droughts, sea- level rise, more powerful hurricanes, and changed pre-
cipitation. 8 The risk pooling schemes we consider here are concerned with hurricanes, droughts, 
excess rainfall, tsunamis, and earthquakes. With the exception of earthquakes and tsunamis, cli-
mate change aggravates these hazards. Thus, the droughts become more frequent and more 
prolonged, 9 the hurricanes become more powerful, 10 and the precipitation patterns are more 
likely to change. 11 Indeed, we will argue that climate change has four important characteristics 
  4  See in this respect  J.  Syroka and  R.  Wilcox , ‘ Rethinking international disaster aid i nance ’,  Journal of International 
Affairs ,  59 ( 2006 ),  197 – 214 at 207f. 
  5  The African Risk Capacity ARC has observed that ‘preliminary i ndings indicate potential savings of 50% from diver-
sii cation of drought- related losses across Africa, i.e. a 50 per cent reduction in the contingent funds needed if the risk 
is pooled among nations and managed as a group rather than borne by each country individually’, cf.,  https:// unfccc 
.int/ i les/ adaptation/ application/ pdf/ consultation_ note_ eng.pdf (accessed 25 May 2018). 
  6  Risk pooling may take many forms. In this chapter we only examine the new Global South, regional multi- country dis-
aster risk pooling schemes. For a presentation of other schemes, see in particular,  www.insuresilience.org/ (accessed 
27 March 2018). 
  7  The Global South risk pooling schemes also play into the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs); in particular 
SDG 2 (end hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition, and promote sustainable agriculture) and SDG 13 
(take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts). See UN General Assembly (UNGA), Resolution 70/ 1, 
Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (21 October 2015) A/ RES/ 70/ 1. 
  8  See, for example,  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ,  Climate Change 2007:  Mitigation of Climate 
Change ( Cambridge University Press ,  2007 ). 
  9  A.  Dai , ‘ Drought under global warming: a review ’,  Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change ,  2 ( 2011 ),  45 – 65 
at  58 – 59 ;  A.  Dai , ‘ Increasing drought under global warming in observations and models ’,  Nature Climate Change ,  3 
( 2013 ),  52 – 58 at  52 . 
 10  T.R.  Knutson et al., ‘ Tropical cyclones and climate change ’,  Nature Geoscience ,  3 ( 2010 ),  157 – 163 . 
  11  K.E.  Trenberth , ‘ Changes in precipitation with climate change ’,  Climate Research ,  47 ( 2011 ),  123 – 138 . 
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that jointly set it apart from most other threats to our societies: 
 First , from a societal point of view, climate change is a new and signii cant factor . Thus, 
according to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) (amongst others), 
Earth’s average surface temperature has risen about 1.1 degree Celsius since the late nine-
teenth century, and most of the warming occurred in the past 35 years, with 16 of the 17 
warmest years on record occurring since 2001. 12 Indeed, it has been estimated that today about 
75 per cent of the moderate daily hot extremes over land are attributable to global warming. 13 
 Second , we view the vast majority of climate change impacts on societies as negative. 
 Third , we may expect climate change (or global warming) to continue for a long period of 
time before, ultimately, the Earth’s average temperature will stabilise at a new and higher 
level. In other words, we are moving towards what the World Bank refers to as a ‘new cli-
mate normal’. 14 This essentially means that at present we are probably facing a continuous 
increase in both the number and the force of climate change induced impacts that will hit 
our societies. 
 Fourth, climate change is so- to- say all- embracing; it affects our societies in multiple, sim-
ultaneous ways. Droughts, melting glaciers, altered precipitation patterns, salinisation- 
intrusion of coastal areas and so on may all adversely affect food production. In addition, 
more powerful storms and l ooding may challenge our infrastructure and supply chains. It 
also affects settlement patterns as well as the spread of diseases. These several and diverse 
impacts may occur simultaneously and sometimes reinforce one another. In other words, 
climate change is likely to produce signii cant adverse impacts on our societies. Risk 
pooling is one of the ways of addressing these impacts. 15 
 3.  Risk Pooling Schemes as a Means for Building Societal 
Resilience Towards Natural Hazards 
 3.1.  How Risk Pooling Works 
 Risk pooling is the principle underlying insurance. Regional risk pooling is based on the 
idea that pooling country- specii c risks within a regional portfolio generates risk diversii ca-
tion benei ts that reduce the aggregate costs of coverage to less than the sum of the individual 
costs of coverage. 16 It is very unlikely, for example, that all Caribbean islands would be hit by 
major hurricanes or earthquakes in any given year. Thus, by pooling risks, the World Bank has 
estimated that countries reduce the cost of individual insurance premiums by nearly half of 
the cost that would apply if each government were to go to the insurance market on its own. 17 
 12  Not only was 2016 the warmest year on record, but eight of the 12 months that make up the year – from January through 
September, with the exception of June – were the warmest on record for those respective months, cf. K. Northon, 
‘NASA, NOAA Data Show 2016 Warmest Year on Record Globally’, NASA TV, 18 January 2017. Available at  www 
.nasa.gov/ press- release/ nasa- noaa- data- show- 2016- warmest- year- on- record- globally (accessed 23 May 2018). 
 13  E.M.  Fischer and  R.  Knutti , ‘ Anthropogenic contribution to global occurrence of heavy- precipitation and high- 
temperature extremes ’,  Nature Climate Change ,  5 ( 2015 ),  560 – 564 . 
 14  S.  Adams et  al.,  Turn Down the Heat:  Confronting the New Climate Normal ( Washington, D.C. :   World Bank 
Group ,  2014 ). 
 15  See also  World Bank ,  Sovereign Climate and Disaster Risk Pooling – World Bank Technical Contribution to the G20 
( Washington, D.C. :  World Bank ,  2017 );  D.  Schoenmaker and  G.  Zachmann ,  Can a Global Climate Risk Pool Help 
the Most Vulnerable Countries? ( Bruegel ,  2015 ). 
 16  World Bank,  Sovereign Climate and Disaster Risk Pooling , p. 32. 
 17  Ibid ., p. 44. 
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However, risk pooling does not reduce risk; it spreads the cost of risk over time and geographic 
area to lessen its impact. 
 Pooled regional risks are normally transferred to the international (re)insurance markets, 
taking advantage of potential i nancial efi ciencies. 18 Developing country weather risks are 
hereby combined in portfolios of commercial risks held by international reinsurers and hedge 
funds, which allows the developing countries to benei t from increased diversity and the appetite 
that the international market has for a greater range of risks. 19 As explained above, by combining 
and spreading the risks faced by a diverse set of actors, pooling ensures that the total risk of all 
participants is less than the sum of the individual risk of each participant would be; in other 
words, 2+2 will only equal 3.  However, developing countries do not always have the neces-
sary legal frameworks and i nancial resources available to take full advantage of risk pooling. 
Consequently, there is a need for developing national laws and norms necessary to facilitate and 
regulate sovereign risk pools as well as ensuring that international law is suited to governing sov-
ereign i nancial transactions of this type. 
 3.2.  Advantages of Risk Pooling 
 Hazards such as hurricanes, droughts, l oods, and earthquakes strike all parts of the world, 
and thus impact societies both in the afl uent Global North and in the poorer Global South. 
However, the welfare impacts from such hazards on societies are generally more adverse in the 
Global South. 20 Thus, the economic losses relative to economic output are much larger in the 
Global South and, generally speaking, the economic losses relative to gross domestic product 
(GDP) are much higher for small countries in the tropics. According to the United Nations 
Ofi ce for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR), economic losses from natural disasters average 
between USD 250 and 300 billion per year, worldwide. 21 Across 77 of the poorest countries, nat-
ural disasters such as hurricanes and severe droughts cost USD 30 billion a year. 22 The impact 
of these hazards is greater on poor people because they are exposed to hazards more often, lose 
a bigger share of their wealth when hit (a loss equivalent to USD 100 may be critical to a poor 
person and insignii cant to a wealthy one), and receive less support after a crisis. 23 Indeed, it is 
estimated that on average every year l oods and drought together are responsible for the extreme 
poverty of about 25 million people, and that if all disasters could be prevented for one year, the 
number of people in extreme poverty would be immediately reduced by around 26  million 
worldwide. 24 
 Societies in the Global North are more resilient to hazards. This is not only due to the Global 
North having better infrastructure and institutions, being less exposed than the tropics, and 
 18  J.D.  Cummins and  O.  Mahul ,  Catastrophe Risk Financing in Developing Countries: Principles for Public Intervention 
( Washington, D.C. :  World Bank ,  2008 ), p.  4 ;  L.  Wolfrom and  M.  Yokoi- Arai , ‘ Financial instruments for managing 
disaster risks related to climate change ’,  OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends , 2015/ 1 ( 2016 ),  25 – 47 at 14. 
 19  S.  Hochrainer- Stigler , et al., ‘ Funding public adaptation to climate- related disasters. Estimates for a global fund ’, 
 Global Environmental Change ,  25 ( 2014 ),  87 – 96 at  89 ; Syroka and Wilcox, ‘Rethinking International Disaster Aid 
Finance’, at 198. 
 20  S.  Hallegatte et al.,  Unbreakable: Building the Resilience of the Poor in the Face of Natural Disasters ( Washington, 
D.C. :  International Bank for Reconciliation and Development, The World Bank Group ,  2017 ). 
 21  UNISDR ,  Global assessment report on disaster risk reduction 2015: Making development sustainable: the future of dis-
aster risk management ( UNISDR ,  2015 ), p.  xiv . 
 22  A. Whiting, ‘Insurance for poor could protect the most disaster- vulnerable- governments’, Reuters, 29 July 2017. 
 23  Hallegatte et al.,  Unbreakable . 
 24  Ibid ., p. 75. 
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having better social protection systems and higher savings. But also to the fact that in the Global 
North it is common to hedge against the uncertain losses caused by hazards by taking out insur-
ance coverage. 25 Indeed, the UK Department for International Development (DFID) estimates 
that nearly half the costs of ‘natural’ hazards are insured in wealthier countries. 26 In contrast, 
in poorer countries insurance is much less common, with less than i ve per cent of the cost of 
natural hazards insured. 27 
 Traditionally, governments have borne these losses, with international organisations such as the 
UN World Food Programme (WFP) often playing the role of de facto insurer of last resort to vul-
nerable populations in developing countries. 28 International organisations and humanitarian non- 
governmental organisations (NGOs) essentially seek to address a portfolio of risks that are almost 
certain to occur; the uncertainty concerns where and at what magnitude. They rely on uncertain 
funding l ows from donors to i nance their operations, at a time when donor assistance is struggling 
to keep up with growing needs. The UN humanitarian appeal for 2017 sought USD 22.6 billion in 
support for 93.5 million people in 33 countries, up from just USD 7.4 billion in 2011. 29 On average, 
only about 60 per cent of the humanitarian appeal needs are met, causing signii cant concern 
about the international community’s ability to reach the world’s most vulnerable people in times 
of crisis, and the humanitarian funds that are available are not equally allocated between emergen-
cies. 30 For example, six months after Haiti was hit by a devastating earthquake in 2010, the country 
had received less than two per cent of the USD 10 billion that international donors had promised. 31 
 Assistance provided by the international community (if any) is normally complemented by 
national governments reallocating funds in their national budgets from planned development 
activities to crisis response thereby slowing down the former activities and reducing overall 
national resilience. In small developing states, for example, the average annual cost of disasters 
has been found to be 1.8 percent of their GDP. 32 This high cost of disasters, coupled with the 
cost of response, means that countries have less money to invest in development activities of all 
types, including, but not limited to developing the resilient infrastructure that would enable 
them to better withstand future disasters. 33 Without sufi cient mitigation, governments suffer 
from revenue and expenditure volatility that can impact the delivery of public services. 34 This 
 25  Even though insurance coverage is common in the Global North, this is not to say that its full potential is exploited. 
See for example  F.  Waldenberger , ‘ Confronting earthquake risk in Japan- are private households underinsured? ’,  Asia 
Europe Journal ,  11 ( 2013 ),  79 – 91 ;  H.  Kunreuther , ‘ Disaster mitigation and insurance: Learning from Katrina ’,  The 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science ,  604 ( 2006 )  1 ,  208 – 227 . 
 26  Whiting, ‘Insurance for poor could protect the most disaster- vulnerable- governments’. 
 27  Ibid . 
 28  Syroka and Wilcox, ‘Rethinking International Disaster Aid Finance’, at 199. Syroka and Wilcox point out that the 
WFP ‘raises aid funds from donors after the disaster – the loss – has occurred’. Thus, in practice donors – together 
with national governments – will often be the real insurers of last resort. 
 29  United Nations Ofi ce for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) ,  Global Humanitarian Overview 
2017: A Consolidated Appeal to Support People Affected by Disaster and Conl ict ( OCHA ,  2017 );  United Nations , 
 Humanitarian Appeal 2011: Consolidated Appeal Process ( UN ,  2011 ). 
 30  R. Chandran and C. Hajaj, ‘Time for a Reset: Fixing the Faulty Humanitarian Appeals Process’, UNU- CPR Centre 
for Policy Research (10 November 2015). 
 31  United Nations Economic and Social Council, ‘Less Than 2 Per cent of Promised Reconstruction Aid for Quake- 
Devastated Haiti Delivered, Haitian Government Envoy Tells Economic and Social Council’, UN Meetings 
Coverage and Press Releases, 13 July 2010. Available at  www.un.org/ press/ en/ 2010/ ecosoc6441.doc.htm (accessed 24 
May 2018). 
 32  International Monetary Fund (IMF), ‘Small States’ Resilience to Natural Disasters and Climate Change- the Role for the 
IMF’, IMF Policy paper (7 November 2016), p. 11. Available at  www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2016/110416.pdf (accessed 
17 December 2018). 
 33  Ibid ., p. 24. 
 34  F. Ghesquiere and O.  Mahul, ‘Building Financial Resilience Against Natural Disasters and Climate Change’, 
Commonwealth Finance Ministers Report 2012, World Bank (2012), p. 2. 
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is particularly problematic in low- and middle- income countries where rapid urbanisation 
combined with insufi cient territorial planning and lack of safe building standards may result 
in exponential growth in assets exposed to threat of damage. 35 Countries may also rely on loans, 
increasing their national debt. Whatever costs are not borne by the government or the inter-
national community are necessarily passed on to the people directly affected by the hazard. 36 
 Risk pooling is intended to move the cost of disaster response away from the traditional, ad 
hoc method of dealing with disasters, and instead make funding l ows following disasters predict-
able for governments and vulnerable populations. It also shifts actual expenditures from ex post 
to ex ante, allowing the costs of disasters to be spread over a number of years at a predictable rate 
rather than requiring a country to reallocate its budget to respond to a crisis when it occurs – 
something that is not possible to predict. Risk pools can protect development and resilience 
gains by providing predictable funding, and this ‘thinking ahead’ improves the quality of the 
support governments may choose to give to those parts of their population that are affected by a 
disaster. The predictability is also good for sovereign disaster risk i nancing strategies. In addition, 
by providing funding very quickly after the disaster has struck, the risk pools prevent households 
from engaging in negative coping mechanisms. For example, in Kenya an analysis found that 
early response in grassland areas could reduce the cost of food aid by 50 per cent and the value 
of animal losses by 25 per cent, or more, depending on the intervention used. 37 Moreover, where 
a country is only eligible to participate in a risk pool if it engages in contingency, this necessarily 
means that the risk pooling also encourages hazard risk planning at the national level. 
 Arguably, one of the attractions of a risk pooling scheme is that it puts a price tag on hazards. 
Historically, countries and international organisations have made little effort to quantify the 
costs or benei ts of retaining risk at the national level. Risk reduction activities are typically 
undertaken using funds from national budgets, whereas the cost of responding to disasters to a 
considerable degree has been borne by the international community. This made it difi cult for 
countries to internalise the value of risk reduction or the full costs of retaining the risks from 
hazards. Putting a price to the cost of hazards allows countries to make informed decisions 
regarding climate adaptation, disaster risk reduction expenditures, and contingency plans in an 
objective way, based on transparently monetised disaster risk. For example, if a country knows 
that its cost of response to a drought in an area would be USD 30 million, and the cost of distrib-
uting drought- resistant seed to the same area is USD 10 million it has an objective way to make 
decisions. This may be contrasted to classic donor- led disaster responses which generally bypass 
the national treasury, meaning that it does not allow for an objective assessment within the 
affected countries’ administrations of the cost of disaster response versus other ways of addressing 
disasters. 
 3.3.  The Creation of Multinational Global South Risk Pooling Schemes 
 The relevance of insurance coverage against hazards was clearly illustrated when Hurricane 
Ivan hit the Caribbean islands in 2004. The devastating hurricane caused more than USD 
 35  Ibid ., pp. 1– 2. 
 36  Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) ,  The impact of natural hazards and disasters on 
agriculture and food security and nutrition: a call for action to build resilient livelihoods ( Rome :   FAO ,  2015 );  C.A. 
 Harvey , et al., ‘ Extreme vulnerability of smallholder farmers to agricultural risks and climate change in Madagascar ’, 
 Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences,  369 ( 2014 ). 
 37  C.C. Venton et al., ‘The Economics of early response and disaster resilience: Lessons from Kenya and Ethiopia’, 
Economic Resilience Final Report (2012). 
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18 billion in total damage across a swath of the island countries. 38 The small island nation of 
Grenada, for example, suffered damages equal to twice its gross domestic product . 39 In response , 
the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Heads of Government approached the World Bank to 
help them establish the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF) (now, CCRIF 
SPC), the world’s i rst multi- country, sovereign risk pool. 40 CCRIF was established as a regional 
catastrophe fund intended to provide funding to Caribbean governments in case of a hurricane 
or earthquake, and in particular to help mitigate the short- term cash l ow problems suffered by 
those governments. 41 It began offering insurance coverage for hurricanes and earthquakes to 
Caribbean governments in 2007, and providing insurance against excess rainfall in 2013. In 2014, 
CCRIF expanded its coverage into Central America and changed its corporate form to that of a 
‘special purpose company’ (SPC). As of 2017, CCRIF was providing insurance to 17 countries in 
Latin America and the Caribbean. CCRIF has paid out approximately USD 130 million 42 since 
its inception, including approximately USD 61.5 million during the 2017 Atlantic Hurricane 
season (as of 30 October 2017). 43 
 An important argument behind the creation of the CCRIF was that ex post disaster funding 
from international aid agencies fails to address the critical need for short- term liquidity, simply 
because it takes too long from when the disaster strikes and until the emergency assistance from 
the aid agencies begins l owing into the countries that had been hit. However, such liquidity 
is necessary to maintain essential government services until additional resources become avail-
able. This challenge is met by the CCRIF since it provides liquidity quickly, by using predei ned 
parametric triggers, as explained in section  3.4.2 . 
 Following the creation of CCRIF other multi- country parametric risk pools have seen the 
light of day, namely the Pacii c Catastrophe Risk Insurance Pilot that is an integral part of 
the Pacii c Catastrophe Risk Assessment and Financing Initiative (PCRAFI) 44 and the ARC. 45 
Whereas the former is rather similar to CCRIF, ARC differs on important points. In what follows 
 38  E.S. Blake, C.W. Landsea, and E.J. Gibney, ‘NOAA Technical Memorandum NWS NHC- 6’ (2011), at 9; ‘Counting 
the cost’, The Economist, 16 September 2004. 
 39  Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OESC) ,  Grenada: macro- socio- economic assessment of the damages caused 
by Hurricane Ivan, September 7 2004 ( St Lucia :  OECS ,  2004 ), p.  72 . 
 40  Prior to the creation of the CCRIF some single- country risk pools had been established in the Global South. For 
example, the Mexican Natural Disaster Fund (FONDEN) was created in 1996 and in 2000 the Turkish Catastrophe 
Insurance Pool (TCIP) established a compulsory earthquake insurance scheme in Turkey. Regarding these two 
schemes, see further  The World Bank ,  FONDEN Mexico’s Natural Disaster Fund  – A  Review ( Washington, 
D.C. :  World Bank ,  2012 );  E.  Gurenko ,  Earthquake Insurance in Turkey: History of the Turkish Catastrophe Insurance 
Pool ( Washington, D.C. :  World Bank ,  2006 ); Dask – Turkish Natural Catastrophe Insurance Pool, ‘Earthquake will 
pass and the life will go on’. Available at  www.tcip.gov.tr/ hakkinda.html (accessed 27 March 2018). 
 41  For the background to the CCRIF, see  M.  Bennett and  S.  Smyth , ‘ How Capital Markets Can Help Developing 
Countries Manage Climate Risk ’,  Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review ,  43 ( 2016 ),  251 – 280 ; CCRI SPC, 
‘FAQ’. Available at  www.ccrif.org/ faq- questions- inline (accessed 24 May 2018). 
 42  CCRIF SPC ,  CCRIF SPC Annual Report 2016– 2017 ( Cayman Islands :  CCRIF SPC ,  2017 ), pp.  7 – 8 . 
 43  Ibid ., p. 8. 
 44  Sometimes the risk insurance component of the PCRAFI is referred to as the ‘PCRAFI Pilot’. 
 45  At the time of writing, several actors including CCRIF and the World Bank are also working on the establishment of 
a parametric risk pooling scheme as part of the promotion of food security and climate resilience in the Caribbean 
i sheries sector; the Caribbean Ocean Assets Sustainability Facility (COAST) (sometimes the abbreviation is said to 
mean Caribbean Oceans and Aquaculture Sustainability Facility). See further UNISDR, ‘Caribbean Oceans and 
Aquaculture Sustainability Facility (COAST)’, UNISDR (2017), available at  www.unisdr.org/ i les/ globalplatform/ 
5930912268d82COAST_ one- page_ handout_ i nal.pdf ; J. Duncan, ‘Promoting Food Security and Climate Resilience 
in the Caribbean’, United States Department of State – Ofi cial Blog, 9 October 2015. Available at 2007- 2017- blogs.
state.gov/ stories/ 2015/ 10/ 09/ promoting- food- security- and- climate- resilience- caribbean.html (accessed 24 May 2018). 
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there will be situations where we will therefore have to distinguish between CCRIF (together 
with PCRAFI) and ARC. 
 3.4.  The Workings of Global South Parametric Risk Pooling Schemes 
 3.4.1.  Background to the Risk Pooling Schemes 
 All the risk pools that we consider in this chapter pre- dei ne one or more specii c hazard 
occurrences. With respect to these occurrences, the participating countries only pay for their 
own risk, but when re- insuring these risks the risk pools take on the total risk proi le of the group 
of countries that together form the pool rather than the risk proi le of each of these countries 
individually. The pools hereby combine the uncertainty of individual risks into a calculable 
risk for the covered group of countries as a whole. For example, the ARC scheme addresses 
certain droughts and it combines the risk of such droughts occurring across the countries that 
are members of ARC to take advantage of the natural diversity of these countries. The under-
lying premise is that it is unlikely that droughts will occur in the same year in all countries 
covered by the scheme. Therefore, the exposure of the ARC to co- variant drought risk is sig-
nii cantly smaller than the exposure a member country of the ARC would be subject to if this 
country would have to shoulder the risk alone. This, in turn, means that the ARC can manage 
drought risks with fewer funds than if each of the member countries would have to cover the 
risk individually. 
 At the time of writing (2018) the number of multi- country parametric Global South risk 
pooling schemes addressing the risks caused by hazards is limited to only three. The CCRIF, 
the i rst of the schemes to come into existence, was only formed as recently as in 2007 by 16 
Caribbean countries, with CARICOM as a key actor. 46 The World Bank took on a leading 
role with regards to the technical development of the scheme, 47 and its capitalisation was 
i nanced through contributions to a multi- donor trust fund where funding from the World Bank 
was complemented by contributions from the Caribbean Development Bank and a limited 
number of other donors. 48 Subsequently, PCRAFI was initiated upon the request of the Pacii c 
Island Countries (PICs) with the Pacii c Islands Forum Secretariat following the workings of 
the scheme. As with the CCRIF, the World Bank played an important role in establishing the 
PCRAFI, and just like the CCRIF the establishment of this younger scheme is also to a consid-
erable extent i nanced by traditional donors of development assistance. 49 ARC was developed as 
a joint project between the African Union (AU) and the WFP. It became a specialised agency 
 46  Most of CCRIF’s functions are performed by independent contractors and CCRIF itself therefore has only two 
full- time staff members, cf. CCRIF SPC, ‘Executive Management’. Available at  www.ccrif.org/ content/ aboutus/ 
executive- management (accessed 24 May 2018); CCRIF SPC, ‘The CCRIF Team’. Available at  www.ccrif.org/ 
content/ aboutus/ ccrif- team (accessed 24 May 2018). 
 47  The World Bank,  Implementation Completion and Results Report on a Grant to the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk 
Insurance Facility for a Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Project (2012) p.  8. Available at  http:// documents 
.worldbank.org/ curated/ en/ 733451468225588956/ pdf/ ICR23320P1080500disclosure070270120.pdf (accessed 25 May 
2018). 
 48  Ibid ., Table 2 at p. 7. 
 49  The World Bank, ‘Implementation Completion and Results Report on a Grant to the Pacii c Islands for a Pacii c 
Catastrophe Risk Insurance Pilot Program’, Report No. ICR00003696 (Sydney: 2016); UNISDR, ‘Caribbean Oceans 
and Aquaculture Sustainability Facility (COAST)’. In 2015, in Phase II of the PCRAFI project, the PCRAFI Facility 
was established as a foundation in the Cook Islands to enable a handover of PCRAFI’s work from the World Bank to a 
separate facility. The governance structures of the PCRAFI Facility were developed in consultation with a Technical 
Working Group comprising secretaries of i nance of participating Pacii c Island Countries. 
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of the African Union in 2012 and in 2018 counts 33 AU countries as members. 50 ARC receives 
grant funding from donors for its operational costs and administrative support from WFP. The 
ARC insurance scheme is capitalised by interest- free loans from donors rather than by grants. 51 
 In the case of all three schemes, the affected countries together with regional organisations 
like the AU have played key roles in their establishment, and have turned to international 
organisations (World Bank and WFP, respectively) for assistance. And in all three cases premiums 
and participation fees are, at least principally, paid by the member countries. 
 3.4.2.  Risks Covered by the Global South Risk Pooling Schemes; Calculating Payments 
 The risk pooling schemes we examine here concern the negative impact on societies caused by 
certain hazards; namely droughts (ARC), hurricanes (CCRIF, PCRAFI), earthquakes (CCRIF, 
PCRAFI), tsunamis (PCRAFI), and excess rainfall (CCRIF). 52 
 The Global South risk pooling schemes are based upon so- called parametric insurance; they 
differ from traditional household insurance schemes in that pay- outs are triggered by a prede-
i ned event rather than based on an assessment of the actual post- event losses. Thus, under para-
metric insurance policies when entering into the insurance event the parties to the insurance 
agreement dei ne those events which shall trigger the right to payment as well as the size of 
these payments; for example, a hurricane of a certain magnitude hitting certain predetermined 
cities. These predei ned events (for example, hurricanes) are correlated to a parameter or to an 
index of parameters (in our example: magnitude and cities hit). The use of parametric insur-
ance means that when an insurance event occurs, it will be reasonably straightforward and fast 
to establish whether a payment must be made under the insurance scheme as well as the size 
of such payment. There is no delay to evaluate actual losses to make a pay- out. This means that 
the countries that are hit very quickly receive funding that allows them to address the challenges; 
and speed will often be of the essence in the aftermath of this type of disasters. 53 Even though 
pay- outs are not based on an assessment of post- disaster losses, the schemes base the pay- outs 
upon ‘modelled losses’ (CCRIF and PCRAFI) or ‘modelled response costs’ (ARC); meaning 
that the coverage is modelled against expected consequences (‘losses’ or ‘response costs’) of a 
specii c hazard event. In other words, the speed provided by parametric insurance comes at a 
cost; namely that pay- outs may not match actual losses/ response costs. 
 50  ARC consists of two entities:  the African Risk Capacity Specialized Agency of the African Union (ARC Agency); 
an international organisation. And the African Risk Capacity Insurance Company Ltd (ARC Ltd); an independent 
insurance company organized under the laws of Bermuda. ARC Agency assists countries with capacity building, con-
tingency planning and other support. ARC Ltd handles ARC’s risk pooling and transfer activities, including providing 
parametric insurance coverage for member countries against extreme weather events. This structure is similar to that 
of PCRAFI, which comprises a foundation and an insurance company, but different from CCRIF. 
 51  The German Development Bank, KfW, and DFID committed to provide ARC Ltd, the insurance afi liate of ARC, 
interest- free loans that must only be repaid after 20 years. The premiums paid by the African governments that take 
out insurance from ARC include a percentage of funding that is intended to repay the loans in the future. See further 
 Oxford Policy Management ,  Independent Evaluation of the African Risk Capacity (ARC): Formative Phase 1 Report 
( Oxford :  Oxford Policy Management, Itad ,  2017 ) p.  47 . 
 52  These hazards were selected based on a combination of their impact on the member countries of the respective risk 
pools, and country demand. ARC presently covers droughts. In the future they expect to also cover other hazards, 
including l oods, excess rainfall, tropical cyclones and outbreaks and epidemics of human disease, cf. ARC, ‘How 
ARC works’. Available at  www.africanriskcapacity.org/ 2016/ 10/ 29/ how- arc- works/ (accessed 24 May 2018). 
 53  Under the CCRIF all pay- outs (by March 2015) ‘were transferred to the respective governments within 14 days (and in 
some cases within a week) after the event’ cf. ‘About CCRIF – Flyer March 2015’ (2015), available at  www.ccrif.org/ 
sites/ default/ i les/ publications/ About_ CCRIF_ Flyer_ March_ 23_ 2015_ 0.pdf (accessed 25 May 2018). Similarly, ARC 
is able to provide pay- outs to the countries affected by droughts within 2– 4 weeks of harvest. This means that the i rst 
assistance will reach the affected households within four months. See further ARC, ‘How ARC works’. 
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 That parametric insurance is not without its problems became clear when Malawi experienced 
drought in 2016. The Malawian government estimated that 6.5 million people required food 
assistance whereas ARC’s parametric model initially indicated that only approximately 20,000 
people were affected. ARC undertook i eld research and discovered that farmers had switched to 
growing a different type of crop than that assumed in the model. ARC re- customised its software 
to correct this, resulting in a model outcome providing a better representation of the situation 
on the ground and an insurance pay- out to the government. 54 The NGO ActionAid examined 
what had happened – and concluded that rather than promoting the expansion of climate risk 
insurance markets for the poor and vulnerable, it was necessary to ‘pause and reconsider this 
quest’. 55 They therefore recommended turning to other measures than risk pooling; for example, 
that Malawi should make its social protection system more integrated, scalable, adaptive, and 
universal, that the country should support more climate- resilient, sustainable agriculture, and 
that it should ensure more irrigation, adequately resourcing decentralised DRR and enhancing 
the network of weather stations. Or that it should save at least some of the money each year in a 
contingency fund for disasters. However, we believe that the Malawi case, i rst of all, illustrates 
the importance of carefully designing and continuously improving both the insurance policies 
and the parametric system as such. 56 
 ARC, CCRIF, and PCRAFI are intended to cover infrequent, devastating events where we 
do not have prior knowledge about when and where they will occur next time or how hard they 
will strike. 57 Still, to a fair extent we are able to make predictions about their frequency and 
magnitude based on historical data. This means that the coverage provided by each scheme 
is calculated so that the policies are triggered only in situations in which, before the disaster 
strikes, it is considered very likely that the countries will suffer a signii cant loss/ response costs. 
For example, in 2013 the Solomon Islands suffered a magnitude 8.0 earthquake. The earthquake 
caused losses on the islands, but since the losses were suffered far from the economic centre of 
the Solomon Islands there was only limited impact on core government services, the country’s 
economy, and the country’s future economic development. Under the country’s PCRAFI insur-
ance policy the earthquake was required to have a certain seismic impact in the economic 
centre in order to trigger pay- out, and since the threshold was not reached, the earthquake did 
not trigger payment under the PCRAFI insurance scheme. 58 
 54  Press Release  – Malawi to Receive USD 8M Insurance Payout to Support Drought- Affected Families’, ARC, 14 
November 2016. Available at  www.africanriskcapacity.org/ 2016/ 11/ 14/ press- release- malawi- to- receive- usd- 8m- 
insurance- payout- to- support- drought- affected- families/ (accessed 24 May 2018). 
 55  J.  Reeves ,  The Wrong Model for Resilience: How G7- Backed Drought Insurance FAILED MALAWI, and What We 
Must Learn From It ( Johannesburg, South Africa :  ActionAid International Secretariat ,  2017 ) p.  3 . 
 56  See similarly  ARC Agency, and Oxford Policy Management ,  Building climate and disaster resilience in Africa: Lessons 
from the African Risk Capacity (ARC) ( Oxford :  Oxford Policy Management ,  2018 ), p.  3 ., who observe that it is neces-
sary to customise the risk modelling software’s parameters to accurately rel ect a member country’s risk proi le; 
and that it can take years and regular updating to identify and integrate the correct data sets for a rei ned country 
customisation. 
 57  CCRIF now offers coverage down to i ve- year return periods. From a i nancing point of view this may not be an efi -
cient choice since this essentially means that there will be more insurance events, and as consequence there will be 
more pay- outs and thus higher insurance costs. However, from a political point of view it is a popular choice. With 
regards to ARC, D. J. Clarke and R. V. Hill, ‘Cost- benei t analysis of the African risk capacity facility’, WFP, AU 
Commission (2012), p. 48 observe that ‘ARC should consider not making claim payments to any country more fre-
quently than once every i ve years, on average’. And these two authors also note that ‘[r] educing the claim payment 
frequency to once every eight or 10 years on average, and increasing the level of coverage for those extreme years, 
would be better still from a welfare perspective’. 
 58  The World Bank ,  Pacii c Catastrophe Risk Insurance Pilot Report: From Design to Implementation – Some Lessons 
Learned ( Washington, D.C. :  The World Bank ,  2015 ) p.  34 . 
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 Being based upon parametric insurance, all the Global South risk pooling schemes require 
an unambiguous and independent determination of whether the predei ned parameters have 
been met. The schemes rely on underlying catastrophe risk models based on robust datasets 
provided by internationally recognised bodies such as the United States Geological Survey in 
the case of earthquakes covered by the CCRIF. In addition, the parties will designate an inde-
pendent third party to calculate the pay- out. 59 
 All three risk pooling schemes provide coverage tailored to the individual member country. 
Thus, the member countries may select the level at which they wish to participate in the 
scheme by selecting the amount of risk they wish to retain and the pay- out they want where 
the policy is triggered. In other words, the member countries may opt for a premium that suits 
their i nances by choosing a less generous coverage. 60 The tailoring of each member country’s 
policy 61 means that the countries must decide on the coverage that they wish to obtain, based 
on three parameters: (i) ‘the attachment point’, which means the severity of the event that gives 
rise to a payment, measured by statistical likelihood of occurrence, in years; (ii) ‘the exhaustion 
point’, which refers to the severity of the event loss at or above which the maximum payment 
is triggered; 62 and (iii) ‘the dollar amount of the maximum pay- out’. Each of these three factors 
has an impact on the premium paid so member countries need to balance the features of their 
policy with the budget available to pay the premium. 
 Moreover, the risk pooling schemes are not intended to cover all of the losses following an 
extreme weather event, but rather they are primarily intended to speedily provide i rst- response 
relief. However, this i rst- response relief still must be followed up by traditional (slower) relief 
such as loans and humanitarian relief. In other words, the purpose of the risk pooling schemes 
is to i ll the void that otherwise exists between the time when the disaster strikes and the time 
when traditional assistance arrives, as is illustrated by Figure 13.1. 
 As will be clear, the funds provided by the multi- country parametric risk pools currently oper-
ating in the Global South are intended to provide short- term i nancial liquidity via a quick 
infusion of cash that allows the government to begin to respond immediately to the needs of the 
impacted populations. Countries in the Global South may lack the i nancial resources to pur-
chase insurance that would cover the full costs of response to a disaster; they may also lack the 
capacity to implement a response of the magnitude required. Thus, while risk pooling may be 
a useful tool to help vulnerable societies to respond to climate change manifestations, it should 
not be viewed as a stand- alone solution. 
 3.4.3.  Enhancing Disaster Risk Management Capacity as Part of 
Joining the Risk Pooling Schemes 
 In order to fully understand the workings of the Global South risk pooling schemes, it is 
important to make clear that their objective is to help the member countries of the different 
 59  How these calculations are carried out is laid down in the policies that have been underwritten. 
 60  In 2014 Solomon Islands withdrew from the PCRAFI due to dissatisfaction with the coverage of the scheme, cf. The 
World Bank,  Pacii c Catastrophe Risk Insurance Pilot Report , p. 17. 
 61  Or ‘policies’. For example Trinidad and Tobago has negotiated two parallel policies regarding excess rainfall; one 
covering the island of Trinidad and the other covering the island of Tobago, cf. ‘CCRIF to Make 1st Payout to 
Trinidad & Tobago after October Rains’, CCRF SPC, 30 October 2017. Available at  www.ccrif.org/ news/ ccrif- make- 
1st- payout- trinidad- tobago- after- october- rains (accessed 24 May 2018). 
 62  In other words, the policy only covers losses up to a pre- specii ed limit. For example, in the 2009– 2010 policy year 
CCRIF member countries selected exhaustion points equivalent to between 1- in- 75 and 1– in- 200  year events, cf. 
CCRIF SPC, ‘Understanding CCRIF’s Hurricane and Earthquake Policies’,  Technical Paper series no.  1 (2012), 
1– 8 at 6. 
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risk pools build resilience against particularly adverse hazards – and whilst providing insurance 
coverage is the main objective, the risk pools also help the member countries in other ways. Both 
CCRIF and PCRAFI, for example, have technical assistance programs intended to enhance the 
capacity for disaster risk management in their member countries. 63 CCRIF’s technical assistance 
program has three components:  (i) scholarships and professional development; (ii) regional 
knowledge building; and (iii) support for local disaster risk reduction initiatives. 64 The program 
is intended to strengthen the capacity of both institutions and individuals to respond to hazards 
in the Caribbean. Still, under the CCRIF the member countries are not required to draw up 
contingency plans to enter the scheme, and there are no restrictions on how they may use the 
pay- outs (contrast with ARC below). 
 PCRAFI’s technical assistance program includes both regional and national capacity 
building work streams, as well as support to build technical collaboration, including with 
CCRIF and ARC. 65 PCRAFI’s national government technical assistance program is intended 
to help member countries incorporate contingency plans into existing national frameworks 
and build capacity in post- disaster public i nancial management. Although contingency 
planning is one of PCRAFI’s six key principles, 66 countries are not currently required to 
develop a contingency plan before taking out insurance; nor are they required to provide 
information on how the funds are spent once received. 67 An undated description of PCRAFI 












 Figure 13.1  Purpose of Risk Pooling Schemes 
 63  In addition to providing insurance, CCRIF works with partner organisations such as the Caribbean Institute for 
Meteorology and Hydrology (CIMH) and the Caribbean Disaster and Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA) 
to provide data and other technical assistance for better planning for, response to, and recovery from natural 
catastrophes. 
 64  CCRIF SPC,  CCRIF SPC Annual Report 2016– 2017 , pp. 41– 55. 
 65  The World Bank, ‘PCRAFI Facility: Phase II – Enhancing the i nancial resilience of Pacii c Island Countries against 
natural disaster and climate risk’, p. 3. Available at pubdocs.worldbank.org/ en/ 178911475802966585/ PCRAFI- 4- pager- 
web.pdf (accessed 24 May 2018). 
 66  The six principles are: country ownership, i nancial sustainability, contingency planning, accountability and trans-
parency, comprehensive disaster risk i nancing strategy, and link with disaster management agenda, cf. The World 
Bank, ‘PCRAFI Facility: Phase II – Enhancing the i nancial resilience of Pacii c Island Countries against natural 
disaster and climate risk’, p. 1. 
 67  Ibid ., p. 1. 
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well as ex post i nancial reporting procedures to monitor the use of pay- outs as ‘next steps’ to 
be taken in the development of PCRAFI. 68 
 ARC differs from both CCRIF and PCRAFI. Thus, an ARC member country must sign 
a memorandum of understanding for domestic capacity building, 69 it must dei ne a contin-
gency plan for ARC pay- outs, and it must determine risk transfer parameters. 70 When an 
ARC insurance policy is triggered, the pay- out must be spent in conformity with the member 
country’s contingency plan. By putting in place such contingency plans already when the 
insurance contract is entered into, the member countries will be able to act very quickly 
after the hazard has struck. Contingency plans are specii c to the insured hazard because the 
appropriate disaster responses are often different for different types of hazards. For example, 
while distributing food and animal fodder are typical disaster response activities in a drought 
situation, l ood emergencies may call for building emergency shelters and disease preven-
tion activities. ARC contingency plans are developed in accordance with ARC’s Contingency 
Planning Standards and Guidelines which lay out standardised criteria for contingency plans 
across countries. 71 
 The development of detailed contingency plans is viewed as very important since a swift 
response is often essential in the aftermath of disasters. 72 ARC considers that one of its primary 
objectives is to ensure that early response activities reach those most impacted by extreme wea-
ther events in Africa. The member countries are therefore required to identify the optimal use 
of any ARC pay- out given the existing national risk management structures and the needs of 
potential benei ciaries, 73 and member country governments are encouraged to harmonise their 
ARC contingency plans with other national contingency plans. 74 Unfortunately, there is limited 
coordination between ARC and other entities, such as the World Bank or bilateral donors, that 
also encourage contingency planning in ARC member countries. International organisations 
and donors have made some attempts to coordinate their contingency planning work with 
member governments, but until now only with limited success. 
 4.  Evaluating the Global South Risk Pooling Schemes 
 4.1.  Global South Risk Pooling in the Context of International Agreements 
 As observed in  section 1 , the Global South risk pooling schemes examined in this chapter fall 
squarely within the Sendai Framework, and in particular within the third of the Framework’s 
four priorities which concerns investing in disaster risk reduction for resilience. Thus, according 
 68  Ibid ., p. 4. 
 69  The capacity building programme covers early warning, risk modelling, contingency planning, disaster risk man-
agement, and risk i nancing. Capacity building to a considerable extent is about training key actors (typically civil 
servants). It is therefore important that the turnover of staff is not too high. This is a real challenge, however, as 
pointed out in ARC Agency, and Oxford Policy Management,  Building climate and disaster resilience in Africa , p. 3. 
 70  ARC, ‘ARC Criteria for Granting Good Standing’, ARC/ LW3/ D004.1209_ 16. Available at  www.africanriskcapacity 
.org/ wp- content/ uploads/ 2017/ 03/ ARC_ Criteria- for- Granting- CGS_ EN_ 20160912_ v04.pdf (accessed 24 May 2018). 
 71  See further AU, Agreement for the Establishment of the African Risk Capacity (ARC) Agency, Pretoria, 23 November 
2012, not yet in force but applied provisionally, art. 13(2(h)), and (l), and; ARC, ‘Contingency Planning Standards and 
Guidelines’. Available at  www.africanriskcapacity.org/ 2016/ 12/ 05/ standards- and- guidelines/ (accessed 24 May 2018). 
 72  IMF ,  Small States’ Resilience to Natural Disasters and Climate Change  – Role for the IMF , IMF Policy Paper 
( Washington, D.C. :  IMF ,  2016 ) p.  32 . 
 73  ARC, ‘ARC Criteria for Granting Good Standing’; ARC, ‘Contingency Planning’. Available at  www.africanriskcapacity 
.org/ 2016/ 10/ 31/ contingency- planning/ (accessed 24 May 2018). 
 74  ARC, ‘ARC Criteria for Granting Good Standing’; ARC, ‘Contingency Planning – African Risk Capacity’. 
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to the Sendai Framework, risk transfer, risk sharing, and insurance should be promoted and 
strengthened at national levels with the support of the international community and other 
stakeholders. 
 The Sendai Framework is not the only international agreement promoting the establish-
ment of Global South risk pooling schemes addressing disasters, however. Thus, over the last 
decade risk pooling and i nancial protection from climate change have gained increasing 
attention on the global agenda.  In particular, article 8 of the 2015 Paris Agreement 75 states that 
the parties to the agreement ‘recognize the importance of averting, minimizing and addressing 
loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, including extreme wea-
ther events and slow onset events, and the role of sustainable development in reducing the 
risk of loss and damage’ and the provision specii cally calls upon the parties to cooperate on 
‘risk insurance facilities, climate risk pooling and other insurance solutions’. 76 In addition, 
the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage 77 
launched a clearing house for information on risk transfer and insurance aimed at helping 
‘Parties to develop and implement comprehensive risk management’, coinciding with the 2017 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conference of the 
Parties (COP). 78 
 Moreover, in 2015, in response to the Sendai Framework, the G7 adopted the InsuResilience 
Initiative led by the German government, with the goal of increasing ‘access to direct or indirect 
insurance coverage against the impacts of climate change for up to 400 million of the most vul-
nerable people in developing countries by 2020’. 79 The objective of InsuResilience is to cover 
180  million people through the scaling up of the African, Pacii c and Caribbean risk pools, 
and through KfW Development Bank’s Climate Insurance Fund. The German government 
launched the InsuResilience Global Partnership in 2017, at the UN climate summit (COP23) 
in Bonn, with the intention that it would serve as a multi- stakeholder community to ensure 
coordinated global action and increase access to knowledge regarding climate change. 80 It is 
however not clear what the InsuResilience Global Partnership will contribute that goes beyond 
what the existing risk pools and the World Bank are already providing. 
 75  The Sendai Framework was signed by 187 UN member states in March 2015. Paris Agreement, Paris, 12 December 
2015, in force 4 November 2016, C.63.2016. 
 76  Paris Agreement, art. 8(f). 
 77  Established at the 2013 Warsaw Climate Change Conference (COP19) under the UNFCCC, cf. UNFCCC, ‘Warsaw 
International Mechanism for Loss and Damage’. Available at unfccc.int/ adaptation/ workstreams/ loss_ and_ damage/ 
items/ 8134.php (accessed 24 May 2018). 
 78  In recital 49 of the Paris Agreement the COP requested ‘the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International 
Mechanism to establish a clearinghouse for risk transfer that serves as a repository for information on insur-
ance and risk transfer, in order to facilitate the efforts of Parties to develop and implement comprehensive risk 
management strategies’. See further United Nations Climate Change Secretariat, ‘Paris Agreement Progress 
Tracker – Work programme resulting from the relevant requests contained in decision 1/ CP.21’ (2018). Available 
at unfccc.int/ i les/ paris_ agreement/ application/ pdf/ pa_ progress_ tracker_ 200617.pdf (accessed 24 May 2018). See 
also UNFCCC, ‘Home: Clearing House for Risk Transfer’. Available at unfccc- clearinghouse.org/ (accessed 24 
May 2018). 
 79  ‘G7 Climate Risk Insurance Initiative  – Stepping Up Protection for the Most Vulnerable’, UNFCCC News, 8 
October 2015. Available at unfccc.int/ news/ g7- climate- risk- insurance- initiative- stepping- up- protection- for- the- most- 
vulnerable (accessed 24 May 2018). 
 80  InsuResilience Global Partnership, ‘Consultation Draft:  Concept Note  – Shaping the InsuResilience Global 
Partnership’ (2017), p.  7. Available at  www.insuresilience.org/ wp- content/ uploads/ 2017/ 12/ Consultation- Draft- 
Concept- Note- InsuResilience- Global- Partnership- Nov- 3.pdf (accessed 24 May 2018); InsuResilience Global 
Partnership, ‘Joint Statement InsuResilience Global Partnership’, UNFCCC COP 23 (Bonn: 2017). 
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 4.2.  Economic Aspects of Transnational Parametric Risk Insurance Pooling 
 The most obvious advantage of the Global South risk pooling schemes arguably is the fact that 
by shouldering the risk together the member countries as a whole become less vulnerable to the 
onslaught from hazards. There are three aspects to this. First, the risk pooling cushions the most 
devastating strokes to the member countries’ societies. 81 Second, since the schemes are based 
on parametric insurance the member countries receive i nancial infusion immediately after the 
disaster has struck, thereby allowing them to act very quickly when addressing the challenges. 
Third, the member countries obtain signii cant economic savings by joining forces in a col-
lective risk pool. 82 For example, ARC has estimated that ‘by collectively pooling and diversifying 
their risks across the continent, countries save up to 50% in the cost of emergency contingency 
funds’. 83 To complete this picture, ARC also observes that an 
 analysis by the Boston Consulting Group shows the potential benei t of ARC outweighs the 
estimated cost of running ARC by 4.4 times compared to traditional emergency appeals for 
assistance, as a result of reduced response times and risk pooling. This means one dollar spent 
on early intervention through ARC saves four and a half dollars spent after a crisis is allowed to 
evolve. 84 
 Participating in a risk pool in other words allows the member countries to focus their efforts 
on development – and to maintain this focus even in the face of major disasters. 
 The Global South risk pooling schemes also have the potential to play an important role for 
investors since they provide the member countries with immediate i nancing, which in prin-
ciple could enable the countries to re- establish critical infrastructure such as electricity. 85 This 
however presupposes that the pay- outs are large enough to re- establish the critical infrastruc-
ture – which is far from always the case. Still, the Global South risk pooling schemes have the 
potential to minimise the risk of investors – and thereby promote long- term investments (and 
thus development). 
 4.3.  Risk Pools as a Catalyst for Societal Adaptation to Hazards 
 The economic aspects of setting up a joint risk pool are not the only advantage that a member 
country derives from the schemes since they do not just provide insurance coverage. Rather, 
to differing extents the schemes take a more holistic approach to creating resilience against 
hazards. All three risk pools attempt to do this through education and partnerships but also, in 
the case of ARC (and PCRAFI in the future), through the use of contingency plans. Thus, ARC 
requires member countries to set up elaborate contingency plans before they are allowed to take 
out insurance. In other words, that the schemes are about ‘infusing resilience’ into the affected 
societies and not only about compensating losses is key to understanding their real value for the 
member countries. 
 81  As we have seen in  section 3.4.2 , the risk pooling schemes have been created to cover solely the most signii cant 
hazards that only occur on an infrequent basis – and the schemes are not intended to cover the total losses incurred, 
but merely to provide immediate relief. 
 82  See, for example, F. Ghesquiere and O. Mahul, ‘Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF): Disaster 
Risk Financing & Insurance Case Study’, World Bank Group (2012). 
 83  Cf. M. Beavogui, ‘Case study: The African Risk Capacity (ARC) and Talking Points’, ARC, Background Sheet 2 
(2016); ARC, ‘How ARC works’. 
 84  ARC, ‘How ARC works’; ‘The Cost of Drought in Africa’, ARC Secretariat (2016), p. 3. 
 85  This does not include ARC because ARC funds cannot be used on infrastructure projects. 
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 The predictable nature of an insurance pay- out from a sovereign risk pool enables countries to 
plan their disaster responses in a way that is not possible when disaster response funds are obtained 
on an ad hoc basis. Moreover, by calculating pay- outs on the basis of parametric triggers, they 
are generally much more predictable and transparent than is humanitarian funding. Indeed, 
humanitarian funding cannot be predicted in advance, and very often such funding does not 
go through the governments’ systems, so the government of the disaster- stricken country cannot 
take control over its own disaster response, and may not even have insight into the amount of 
disaster funding it is receiving. 
 Moreover, the risk pooling schemes enable the affected societies to react very swiftly after the 
disaster has struck. The general view seems to be that an early intervention in combination with 
efi cient contingency planning is signii cantly more cost- efi cient than a slow intervention. 86 
One reason being that an early intervention will act as a safety- net which prevents those affected 
by the disaster from engaging in costly risk- coping mechanisms such as being forced to dispose of 
productive assets (for example, consuming seed grain and slaughtering livestock) to keep alive. 87 
Such risk- coping mechanisms will very likely have long- term adverse effects and cause devel-
opment backsliding. A speedy pay- out from a risk pooling scheme is not in itself sufi cient to 
provide substantial benei ts  vis- à- vis more traditional (and slower) interventions, however. Thus, 
in a 2013 cost- benei t analysis of ARC, Daniel J. Clarke and Ruth Vargas Hill found that there 
are potential speed benei ts from an early pay- out from ARC, as speeding up the disbursement 
of aid reduces the economic losses households face. However, they simultaneously identii ed 
a number of conditions that must be met for these benei ts to materialise. 88 First of all, the two 
authors pointed out that effective contingency plans are essential since without an appropriate 
distribution system the assistance may not reach vulnerable populations in a timely manner; 
even if ARC is able to make an early pay- out. 89 
 The above discussion regarding the benei ts of early intervention after the disaster has struck 
is based on economic considerations only. Early intervention arguably also carries important – 
albeit much less tangible – benei ts in limiting human suffering that may accompany a slow 
intervention. 
 One aspect of the Global South risk pooling schemes, which seems to have attracted only 
limited attention, is the fact that the policies in reality put a ‘value tag’ on different geographic 
parts of societies. For example, if an ARC member country wishes to take out insurance cover 
against drought in a specii c location and it turns out that the likelihood of a severe drought 
(that will trigger a pay- out under the policy) is substantial, the premium may turn out to be pro-
hibitively high. However, this will be a strong indication that the risk of a devastating disaster is 
so substantial that it may reasonably be questioned whether, from an economic point of view, 
the societies in these locations are sustainable. This could likely constitute a strong incentive of 
engaging in disaster risk management. Indeed, it has been hypothesised that the pricing aspect 
of disaster risk insurance could give countries the tools to move from responding to events to 
managing risk since it may help governments, businesses, and households to plan in advance 
of a disaster and to agree on rules and processes for securing funds through their budget and for 
 86  This view seems to lack scientii c backing, cf.  OCHA, Policy Development and Studies Branch (PDSB) , ‘ OCHA and 
Slow- Onset Emergencies ’,  OCHA Occasional Policy Briei ng Series , Brief No.  6 ( 2011 ), p.  10 . 
 87  See, for example,  R.  Cervigni and  M.L.  Morris (eds.),  Confronting Drought in Africa’s Drylands: Opportunities for 
Enhancing Resilience ( Washington, D.C. :  World Bank, Agence Francaise de Development ,  2016 ), p.  174 . 
 88  Clarke and Hill, ‘Cost- benei t analysis of the African risk capacity facility’. 
 89  Ibid ., at 38. 
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spending this money prior to the disaster striking. 90 However, the resiliency benei ts of sovereign 
disaster insurance is strongly linked to preparedness planning. 
 The on- going climate changes mean that we may expect ‘natural’ hazards caused by droughts, 
hurricanes, and changed precipitation to become still more frequent within the foreseeable 
future. This development will necessarily have to be rel ected in the premiums to be paid 
under the Global South risk pooling schemes. If it turns out that these climate changes make 
livelihoods in certain parts of the member countries of Global South risk pooling schemes 
unsustainable, 91 this is likely to be rel ected in the insurance policy – either through increased 
premiums or more limited coverage. 92 The crucial point to make is that risk pooling is a useful 
tool for building resilience, but there are important limits to what can be achieved through risk 
pooling. In particular, if livelihoods in an area become unsustainable, this will be rel ected 
in the insurance coverage. 93 Of course, a member country may choose to take out coverage 
regarding such an area, but it is probably more likely that the country will discontinue the insur-
ance coverage. This will, however, signal to the population in the area that they are ‘on their 
own’ – which in itself may create political challenges. 94 
 5.  Findings 
 Even though the three existing Global South risk pooling schemes are all very young, we 
believe that much can be learned from them. However, before we outline the pros and cons 
of the schemes, it is important to point out that there are major differences between them. 
In particular, on the one hand, the CCRIF and PCRAFI primarily cover small, vulnerable 
island states whereas ARC provides cover to much larger states (many of which are landlocked). 
Moreover, both CCRIF and PCRAFI primarily focus upon infrastructure whereas ARC focuses 
upon farming (i.e. urban versus rural areas). Additionally, CCRIF and PCRAFI are more akin to 
traditional insurance schemes than is ARC. In particular, ARC requires the member countries 
to draw up contingency plans and the ARC member countries are not free to use the insurance 
pay- outs as they like, but rather must use them towards the areas that have been affected by the 
hazard. 
 Bearing these differences in mind, in this chapter we have found that, on the one hand, 
carefully designed Global South risk pools constitute a valuable tool to build resilience against 
hazards in vulnerable societies. On the other hand, it is equally clear that it is a tool which 
only addresses infrequent, devastating events, and the insurance coverage only i nances the 
i rst (limited) response. In other words, the majority of the challenges posed by hazards such as 
droughts must be addressed through other tools. 
 We have also seen that a number of traditional donors such as the World Bank have played key 
roles in the creation of the three existing Global South risk pooling schemes. Indeed, we i nd 
that there are strong arguments in favour of donors encouraging and i nancially supporting the 
 90  World Bank,  Sovereign Climate and Disaster Risk Pooling , p. 26. 
 91  For example, because extreme hurricanes become very frequent. 
 92  Climate change in itself poses a challenge to risk pooling: Risk is priced based on the historical record. An uncertain 
historical record – or one that will not match future events due to climate change – will lead to higher prices because 
of market uncertainty. In their current form risk pools are not equipped to deal with this. We therefore need other 
mechanisms that can respond to increased volatility to make the current risk pooling system effective. 
 93  The premiums for natural hazard insurance coverage is merely a rather rough proxy for the actual costs of resilience 
interventions. On the latter, see for example Cervigni and Morris,  Confronting Drought in Africa’s Drylands , p. 214f. 
 94  Whereas discontinuing taking out insurance coverage is, i rst of all, a political decision, it would seem tempting for a 
member country to blame the risk pooling scheme for introducing prohibitive amendments to the insurance policy. 
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use of such schemes rather than ‘merely’ providing traditional post- hazard assistance. 95 In add-
ition to providing early recovery funding, the schemes also provide the following four advantages: 
 First , the schemes are not only about post- disaster compensation, but also about increasing 
societal resilience, including in the case of ARC requiring member countries to draw up 
pre- disaster contingency plans. 
 Second , putting a price tag (a premium) on the risks of hazards allows the member coun-
tries’ administrations to consider the best way of addressing these risks (cost- benei t). For 
example, it may be more attractive to require new buildings to be better able to withstand 
hurricanes (despite the additional construction costs this will entail) than to merely rely on 
insurance coverage. 
 Third , when it comes to climate change the 2015 Paris Agreement in article 8(1) and (4(f)) 
point to risk pooling schemes like the ones we have examined in this chapter as a way of 
attaining the Agreement’s ‘loss and damage objectives’. The Agreement’s support to the 
creation of risk pooling schemes in itself makes it natural for Western donors to provide 
i nancing to the establishment of this type of schemes. 
 Fourth , the schemes allow for early intervention thereby limiting human suffering that may 
accompany a slow intervention. 
 However , the risk pools examined in this chapter are not without their drawbacks. 
 First , as illustrated by the cases relating to Malawi and to the Solomon Islands, a poor drafting 
of an insurance policy may turn out to be disastrous. It is therefore decisive that each policy is 
very carefully drafted; and that the parametric schemes are continuously improved. 
 Second , poor nations may lack the i nancial capacity to pay for an insurance premium and 
may lack the operational capacity to apply a contingency plan following a signii cant disaster. 
This means that, unless premium subsidies are available from donors, some of the most vulner-
able countries that are most at risk from climate hazards may be unable to afford the coverage 
they need. 
 Third , although an insurance pay- out can have the effect of signalling to other humanitarian 
actors that there is a crisis and quantifying the potential response costs, countries that have 
taken out insurance coverage may also i nd that traditional humanitarian aid donors are hesitant 
to contribute, believing that the insurance coverage eliminates or reduces the need for a full 
humanitarian intervention. 
 Fourth , risk pricing is based on modelled losses. This is done probabilistically and includes 
a large number of data sets and a variety of statistical methods, among which, historical records 
are an important input. To the extent that climate change makes hazards not only more frequent 
and severe, but also harder to predict, this will mean that it becomes increasingly difi cult to 
price such risks and prices may increase to the point where they become unaffordable. 
 Fifth , from an institutional point of view, it is important to be aware that insurance pay- 
outs may be administered by agencies with humanitarian rather than developmental functions. 
This has potential implications for the longer- term desired risk management effects, particularly 
if governments do not integrate their insurance tools into their overall national disaster risk 
planning and development objectives. 
 95  For a somewhat more hesitant view on using development (or humanitarian) aid to support risk pooling schemes, see 
 J.  Linnerooth- Bayer ,  R.R.  Mechler , and  S.  Hochrainer- Stigler , ‘ Insurance Against Losses From Natural Disasters in 
Developing Countries ’,  Journal of Integrated Disaster Risk Management ,  1 ( 2009 )  1 ,  59 – 81 . 
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